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Political integration has been part of the European project from 
its very beginnings. As far back as the early seventies there was 
concern in Brussels that an ingredient was missing i  the 
political integration process. ‘Output legitimacy’ – the 
permissive consensus citizens grant to a government that is 
‘delivering’, even if they do not participate in setting its goals – 
could not sustain unification indefinitely. Such a l cking 
ingredient – or ‘soul’ – has been labelled ‘European identity’ 
(EI) in an abundant and growing academic literature. 
According to Aristotle, ‘polity’ is a specific ‘constitution’ 
(regime or politeia) of a ‘city’ (or polis): a (‘political’) 
community composed of ‘citizens’ (politai). No polis can exist 
unless the politai come together to form it and sustain it. But 
what will gather and keep them united? Citizens canbe very 
diverse regarding their language, history, religion r economic 
activity. In absence of a motivation, diversity of itself will make 
each member of a community go their own way. What kind of 
bond is required among very diverse European citizens to keep 
their polis (the EU) – their political community – together? In 
this paper I analyse several responses – culture, deliberation, 
welfare, power, multiplicity. Then I attempt a synthesis 
suggesting that the answers might be referring to different 
aspects of a single notion – rather than exhaustive explanations 
of it. Finally I mention three issues regarding the concept of EI 
that require further study.  
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Political integration1 has always been part of the European project from its 
very beginnings (Weiler 2002:4) to the moment when the ‘Community’ 
became ‘Union’ (Treaty of Maastricht). ‘For four decades’ – Weiler points 
out –  
‘European politicians were spoiled by a political class which 
was mostly supportive and by a general population which was 
conveniently indifferent. That “moment” has had a 
transformative impact: public opinion in all member states is no 
longer willing to accept the orthodoxies of European integration, 
in particular the seemingly overriding political imperative which 
demanded acceptance, come what may, of the dynamics of 
Union evolution’ (ibid)2.  
As far back as the early seventies there was already a preoccupation in 
Brussels about a missing ingredient that could make political integration 
advance. ‘Output legitimacy’ – the permissive consensus citizens grant to a 
government that is ‘delivering’, even if they do not participate in setting the 
polity’s goals – could not sustain the political unification process 
indefinitely. Romano Prodi, a former Italian Prime Minister and President of 
the European Commission, spoke of a search for Europe’s soul (Prodi 
2000:40-49). Such ‘soul’ – the lacking ingredient – has been sought after in 
the abundant (and growing) academic literature about ‘E ropean identity’ 
(EI). That the term has not only been studied widely by academics, but also 
used profusely by politicians may be indicative of its vagueness and the 
difficulty in defining it satisfactorily. 
 
The concept of EI has been approached from different p rspectives. The one 
that I am interested in is the consideration of EI as a collective bond that 
allows a political community to exist and subsist. According to Aristotle 
                                               
1 I wholeheartedly thank very good observations, advices, discussions and/or constructive 
disagreements from colleagues and friends, especially John Besemeres, Marilu Costa, 
Christian Wicke, Nina Markovic, Conny Heidt, Guy Emerson, Saskia Hufnagel, Simon 
Bronitt, Julie Thorpe, Karis Müller, Ben Wellings, Klaus Klaiber, Dora Horvath, Bruce 
Kent, Ivana Damjanović and Matthew Zagor. Still, any shortcomings in this article are only 
mine.  
2 Emphasis added. 
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(2009:84-87) polity is a specific ‘constitution’ (regime or politeia) of a 
‘city’ (or polis): a (‘political’) community composed by ‘citizens’ (members 
of the community or politai). Under that perspective we could think of the 
polis as the EU, the body of legal treaties as its politeia, and the European 
citizens as the politai. It is clear that an ‘arrangement of the city’ only makes 
sense provided there is a city to arrange. And there is no city without 
‘citizens’. No polis can come to exist – even less last – unless the politai 
come together to form it and stay united in it. But what will give the 
political community cohesion?3 Presumably, something they all have in 
common – strong enough to maintain them together.  
 
Now citizens can be very diverse from each other. In the case of the EU they 
speak different languages, like different food, hold different cultural 
traditions, have different historical backgrounds, profess different religions 
and occupy themselves in different economic activities. Diversity is an 
undeniable fact. Pure diversity will make members of the community go 
each their own way. What kind of bond is required to avoid that they all 
disperse? 
 
That is the quest for EI. In this paper I analyse several responses to it. 
According to them, EI would reside in culture, delib ration, welfare, power 
or multiplicity. Another possible answer is: ‘nothing’. In that case speaking 
about political integration is senseless. It is a perfectly valid option. Yet 
there is already a polity of sorts – the EU. Even though imperfect and 
incomplete, struggling to become more democratic and legitimate, the EU 
presents already a degree of political integration. The ‘problem’ of EI is 
usually discussed not in the complete absence of a polity, but in the 
presence of an existing one – though shaky and ameliorable.  
 
Heiko Walkenhorst, from documents handed to the ‘Convention on the 
Future of Europe’ in 2002-2003, detected five main positions or ‘models’ of 
                                               
3 Obviously, in the absence of a coercive force. 
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EI which he called: ‘historical-cultural’, ‘political-legal’, ‘social’, 
‘international’ and ‘post-identity commonness’ (2009:4-8). His work is not 
the only one trying to classify convincingly the immense amount of 
literature referring to EI (see for example Hurrelmann 2005, Delanty 2002, 
Bellamy 2008). He does present, however, a clear ove view that is useful as 
a departing point to approach the subject. I use that classification to discuss 
EI on this paper.  
 
For reasons of space I will speak only about one author representative of 
each position. Since they have written about the subject under different 
circumstances, at different times, from different disciplinary perspectives 
and often meaning different things, I will try to describe what they say in 
their own terms4. Then I will attempt a synthesis, suggesting that their 
positions might be depicting different aspects of a single notion – rather 
than different notions. Finally I shall mention three issues regarding the 
concept of EI that require further study. 
 
‘Cultural’ EI 
 
Through a historical survey, Ratzinger attempts ‘to discover the deeper, 
more interior identity of Europe’ (2007:20). He see in Herodotus in the V 
century BC the first to conceive of Europe as a geographical concept 
(2007:11-17). With the Hellenistic states and the Roman Empire a continent 
is formed that becomes ‘the basis for later Europe’ around the 
Mediterranean. The triumphant advance of Islam in the VII and VIII century 
cuts boundaries and separates Europe from Asia and Africa. ‘Europe’ grows 
northward to Gaul, Germany, Britain and even Scandinavia, but keeping 
conceptual continuity with the preceding ‘Mediterrane n continent’ (ibid). 
Theologically interpreted ‘in connection with the Book of Daniel, the 
Roman Empire – renewed and transformed by the Christian faith – was 
                                               
4 This will show that authors are not easily classifiable in theoretical shelves: they all could 
be in several categories, though fall mainly into one f them. 
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considered to be the final and permanent kingdom in the history of the 
world’, the ‘Sacrum Imperium Romanum’ (ibid). This process of cultural 
and historical definition – the basis upon which it is possible to speak about 
the concept of Europe for Ratzinger – comes to completion under 
Charlemagne (Ratzinger 2007:14). ‘The establishment of the kingdom of 
the Franks, as the Roman Empire…now reborn’, thinks Ratzinger, 
‘signifies… a decisive step forward toward what we m an today when we 
speak of Europe’ (ibid). After the Carolingian rule the concept of Europe 
almost disappears and will not come back until the XVIII century, as a 
means of self-identification before the Turkish ‘threat’ (ibid).  
 
Another, non-Western root of Europe is that of the Byzantine Roman 
Empire. Byzantium always understood itself as the true Rome. It also 
extended to the north, reaching the Slavic areas and creating its own Greco-
Roman world. Notwithstanding the differences in main language (Greek v 
Latin) liturgy, ecclesiastical constitution and alphabet, Ratzinger claims that 
there were ‘sufficient unifying elements to make one continent out of these 
two worlds’: the common heritage of the Bible and the early Church, the 
origins of the religion in Palestine, the same idea of empire, the basic 
understanding of the Church ‘and hence the common fund of ideas 
concerning law and legal instruments’ (ibid) and finally monasticism, which 
remained an essential guarantor not only of cultural continuity but of 
‘fundamental religious and moral values, of man’s awareness of his ultimate 
destiny…and as a force prior and superior to political authority’ (ibid). With 
the fall of Constantinople in 1453, conquered by the Turks, ‘the Greco-
Christian, European culture of Byzantium came to an end’ (Ratzinger 
2007:18). One of ‘the two wings of Europe’ (the other was the Carolingian 
Empire) was in danger of disappearing. Yet Moscow came into the scene 
and declared itself the ‘Third Rome’. Now ‘the boundaries of the continent 
began to move extensively toward the east, all the way to Siberia – ‘neither 
Asia nor Europe’ – which became ‘a sort of preliminary colonial structure’ 
(ibid).  
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Meanwhile Western Europe splits further, when a large part of the Germanic 
world with a new, enlightened form of Christianity, separated from Rome. 
To the expansion of Europe towards the east (extension of Russia into Asia) 
corresponds a ‘transplanting of Europe’, in both its Western forms 
(Germanic-Protestant and Latin-Catholic) beyond its geographical 
boundaries to America, which becomes a colony like Siberia – at least until 
the beginning of the XIX century (Ratzinger 2007:19), when the ‘New 
World’ receives the impact of another turning point in Europe’s history: the 
French Revolution. With it, the spiritual framework ‘without which Europe 
could not have been formed’ falls to pieces (Ratzinger 2007:20). As a 
consequence, ‘in the realm of ideas…the sacred foundation for history and 
for the existence of the State was rejected; history was no longer gauged on 
the basis of an idea of a pre-existent God who shaped it…for the very first 
time in history, a purely secular state arose’, considering the divine 
guarantee and ordering of the political sector ‘a mythological world view’. 
God himself was declared ‘a private affair that didnot play a role in public 
life’. Popular will was seen solely as ‘a matter of reason, by which God did 
not appear to be clearly knowable; religion and faith in God belonged to the 
realm of feelings and not to that of reason’. ‘A new type of schism arose 
which ran through the Latin nations as a deep breach’. Meanwhile, the 
Protestant realm allowed within itself room ‘for liberal and Enlightenment 
ideas, without that necessarily destroying the framework of a broad, basic 
Christian consensus’ in their polities. The former idea of power (divinely 
inspired) disappeared, yielding to a new one in which nations and states, 
identifiable through uniform linguistic regions, appeared as the unique and 
true subjects of history. Each European nation considered itself unique and 
entrusted with a universal mission, with the resulting deadly great wars of 
the XX century (Ratzinger 2007:20-22).   
 
Ratzinger perceives a deep crisis in today’s Europe as closely connected 
with identity. With the triumph of the post-European technological-secular 
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world, with the globalisation of its way of life and its manner of thinking, 
‘one gets the impression…that the very world of European values – the 
things upon which Europe bases its identity, its culture and its faith – has 
arrived at its end and has actually already left the scene…’ (Ratzinger 
2007:23). Hence EI for him means ‘values’, and these closely related to 
history, culture and Christianity. Europe, in its hour of greatest success in 
terms of peace and prosperity, appears to be in a crisis that ‘endangers its 
life’ and which is dealt with cultural transplants (especially from Islam and 
Buddhism), not only in terms of values but even in the most basic biological 
sense as well: ‘there is a strange lack of will for the future. Children, who 
are the future, are seen as a threat to the present…This invites a comparison 
with the decline of the Roman Empire: it was still functioning as a great 
historical context, but in practice it was already living off of those who 
would eventually break it up, because it no longer had any vital energy of its 
own’ (Ratzinger 2007:24). He compares the view of Oswald Spengler with 
that of Arnold Toynbee: for the former Europe – a ‘cultural continent’ as 
Ratzinger calls it – has arrived at its final epoch and runs inexorably towards 
death or the handing on of its gifts to a new, emerging culture (with a 
different identity); under the perspective of the latter, Europe is in the midst 
of a crisis because it has fallen from religion to the worship of technology, 
the nation and militarism – secularism – but it can revert the tendency by 
reintroducing the religious heritage, especially Christianity (2007:24-25).  
 
Ratzinger does not seem to be arguing only for a remembrance of the past in 
a romantic fashion. He sees the question of EI as a guarantee for the future. 
He wonders to this respect: ‘What is there, today and tomorrow, that 
promises human dignity and a life in conformity with ?’ (2007:26). He 
conceives EI in terms of culture, with religion and history as components.  
 
What Soul for Europe?                     Unity, Identity & Diversity in the EU 
 8 
After the French Revolution, two models of intercourse between religion 
and secularism were taking shape in Europe: a laicist5 model in the Catholic, 
Latin (derived language) nations, with strict confinement of religion outside 
the public life, and a secular model in the Protestant, Germanic (derived 
language) nations, where an enlightened Christian religion, ‘essentially 
understood as morality…assured a moral consensus and a broad religious 
foundation to which the faiths other than the State religion had to conform. 
Laicist models ‘proved to be fragile and have fallen victims to 
dictatorships’. They only survive ‘because parts of the old moral 
consciousness continue to exist…making possible a basic moral consensus’ 
(ibid). The secular model with a state church suffer today from attrition: 
‘religious bodies derived from the State no longer provide any moral force, 
whereas the State itself cannot create [it]’ (Ratzinger 2007:27).  
 
To the laicist and secular models6 Ratzinger adds two more: the social-
democrat, which served as a counterbalance to the two existing models in 
both, ‘Latin’ and ‘Germanic’ countries, and the totalitarian (communist) 
associated with a rigidly materialistic and atheistic philosophy of history, in 
which ‘religion becomes a superfluous relic from the past’. Communism’s 
scientific appearance conceals an intolerant dogmatis : spirit is the product 
of matter, morals are the product of circumstances and must be 
defined…according to the goals of society…there are no longer any values 
apart from the goals of progress. ‘At a given moment verything can be 
permitted’ and become ‘”moral” in a new sense of the word. Even man can 
become an instrument…’ (Ratzinger 2007:29). The communist systems, 
                                               
5 The wording is mine to distinguish a moderate kind of secularism (which I call simply 
‘secularism’) from a militant version – typical of some ‘Latin’ countries with France as the 
prototype – which becomes an equivalent to fundamentalism in religion. ‘Laicism’ refers in 
this paper to the second kind. Prominent secularists and atheists such as Jürgen Habermas 
(see Habermas 2006) or Marcello Pera (see Ratzinger & Pera 2006), for instance, do not 
belong to this kind. As a curiosity, in ‘transplanted Europe’ beyond the Atlantic (America) 
two neighbours exemplify either kind of secularism: mostly moderate in USA, mostly 
laicist in Mexico. 
6 Of of intercourse between religion and secularism. 
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points out Ratzinger, have foundered, ‘above all because of their false 
economic dogmatism. But too often people ignore the fact that the more 
fundamental reason for their shipwreck was their contempt for human 
rights, their subjection to morality to the demands of the system and to their 
promises for the future’. The real catastrophe they left behind is not 
economic. It ‘consists, rather, in the drying up of s uls, in the destruction of 
moral conscience’. For him, the former communists have quickly become 
liberals in terms of economic doctrine, yet the moral and religious problem 
has not been solved: ‘the loss of man’s primordial certainties about God, 
about himself, and about the universe – the loss of awareness of intangible 
moral values – is still our problem, especially today, and it can lead to the 
self-destruction of the European consciousness’ (ibid).  
 
Ratzinger wonders: ‘In the violent upheavals of our time, is there a 
European identity that has a future and to which we can commit ourselves 
with all our might?’ Then he enunciates ‘the foundational moral elements’ 
that in his opinion should not be missing from EI. The first one is the 
unconditional character of human dignity and human rights, values which 
are prior to any governmental jurisdiction. These values are not created by 
the legislator but exist in their own right and must be respected by him as 
values of a higher order. These values are ultimately d rived from God who 
has made man to his image, and are therefore inviolable7. The fact that they 
cannot be manipulated by anyone is the real guarantee of human’s liberty 
and greatness. Ratzinger claims that the human dignity, equality, solidarity, 
democracy and rule of law present in the European treaties, imply an image 
of man, a moral option, and a concept of law that are ‘by no means obvious 
                                               
7 Elsewhere (Ratzinger 2005) he points out to the Decalogue in the Bible as the origin of 
those values. ‘The Muslims’, he says, ‘who in this re pect are often and willingly brought 
in’ (the discussion about mentioning God in the European Constitution) ‘do not feel 
threatened by our Christian moral foundations, but by the cynicism of a secularized culture 
that denies its own foundations. Neither are our Jewish fellow citizens offended by the 
reference to the Christian roots of Europe, in as much as these roots go back to Mount 
Sinai: They bear the sign of the voice that made its lf heard on the mountain of God and 
unite with us in the great fundamental orientations that the Decalogue has given humanity’.  
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but that are actually fundamental values in the identity of Europe’ – he is 
referring here to their grounding in the Judeo-Christian tradition. ‘This 
constitutive elements, along with their concrete consequences, ought to be 
guaranteed in the future European Constitution; certainly they can be 
defended only if a corresponding moral consciousness is continually formed 
anew’ (Ratzinger 2007:30-31).  
 
A second element related to EI is marriage and (family). Monogamous 
marriage, ‘modelled in the basis of biblical faith’, open to children, is a 
fundamental structure of the relation between man and woman. It is also the 
basic cell in the formation of a larger community. In Ratzinger’s opinion 
this gave Europe (in the East and in the West) ‘its particular face and its 
particular humanity’. Marriage and family were founded on ‘patterns of 
fidelity and self-denial’. Europe, he says, ‘would not be Europe if this 
fundamental cell of its social edifice were to disappear or if its nature were 
to be changed (2007:31-32).  
 
The third foundational moral element of EI for Ratzinger is respect for what 
is sacred to someone else and especially for God, even from those who do 
not believe in him. ‘Where this respect is violated, something essential in a 
society is lost’ (2007:32-33). Then he notices a phenomenon of ‘self-hatred 
in the Western world that is strange and that can be considered 
pathological’. He is referring mainly to Europe, but not only. The West is 
making a ‘praiseworthy attempt’ to open up to ‘foreign values’ and 
understand them. But ‘it no longer loves itself; from now on it sees in its 
own history only what is blameworthy and destructive, whereas it is no 
longer capable of perceiving what is great and pure. In order to survive, 
Europe needs a new – and certainly a critical and humble – acceptance of 
itself’. Then he adds ‘that is, if it wants to survive’ (ibid).  
 
He sees in multiculturalism – ‘continually and passionately encouraged’ in 
Europe – sometimes little more than the abandonment and denial of its own 
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(cultural) heritage. Denying its own identity Europe would be depriving 
others of a service to which they have a right. Multic turalism itself calls 
Europeans to come to their senses and look deep within themselves again, 
because the ‘absolute secularity that has been takig shape in the West is 
something profoundly foreign’. He concludes hoping that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU be ‘a first step, a sign that Europe is 
consciously looking again for its soul’, and that believing Christians see 
themselves as a creative minority that contributes to Europe’s recovery of 
‘the best of its heritage and thus to the service of all mankind’ (Ratzinger 
2007:34).  
 
From the preceding paragraphs it seems that for Ratzinger ‘culture’ has as 
some of its components history and religion. Along his writing he does not 
appear to be mainly concerned for the survival of Christianity in Europe, 
trying to keep its ‘market-share’ as it were, in a scenario of rival and 
competing religions. Of course Christianity is having a tough time in Europe 
today. But, after all, it did not start in Europe and has today its most 
significant growth in other continents, especially Africa and Asia (Vatican 
Information Service 2010). What he appears to be implying is that in 
denying its ‘Christian heritage’ Europe will not belosing part of its history 
but an essential component of its own identity, what Europeans have in 
common with each other and what distinguishes them fro others. Clearly 
Christianity is one element, yet Ratzinger places it as crucial when it comes 
to appreciating the moral foundations of achievements deeply engrained in 
how Europeans see themselves such as human dignity, democracy and the 
rule of law.  
 
His position says very little about concrete policy and even about a 
comprehensive account of EI. He clearly does not pre end that Christianity 
exhaust the meaning of EI, but is arguing that it has an indispensable place 
in it. Certainly, apart from pointing to the biological fact that native 
Europeans – Norwegians, Italians, Dutch or Germans in their traditional 
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traits of, say, the last thousand years – seem to be disappearing as peoples8 
because of below-replacement level birth-rates, his position is not ‘ethnic’. 
It is important to notice this since often the adjective ‘ethnic’ is sometimes 
attached to ‘culture’ in discussions about EI9. Identity set on ethnic grounds, 
with all the charge of racism and xenophobia that tis implies, is of course 
unacceptable. And though there might be thinkers who pose cultural identity 
in ethnic terms10, Ratzinger’s position about EI is set rather in cultural 
terms, whereby ‘Europe is a cultural (and historical) oncept’ (2007:11).   
 
‘Deliberative’ EI 
 
In what could be called a ‘manifesto on EI’ written o  February 15 2003 
from ‘the core of Europe’ with the assent of Jacques Derrida, Habermas 
(2003), tried to depict those aspects that unite Europeans and differentiate 
them from ‘others’, especially from USA. For Habermas (2003:291) the 15 
of February 2003 may be seen retrospectively in history as the birth of the 
European public sphere. At the international level and in the framework of 
the UN, Europe had to ‘throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the 
hegemonic unilateralism of the United States’ (Habermas 2003:293). He 
hints to ‘a feeling of common political belonging’ (ibid), the subjective part 
of EI. The European population must add to their natio l identities – which 
engender an already abstract, ‘civic solidarity’ – a European dimension.  
 
EI in this context seems to be also ‘the consciousnes  of a shared political 
fate and the prospect of a common future’. EI must make citizens of one 
(European) nation regard the citizens of another (European) nation ‘as 
                                               
8 See Murphy (2006) for insights on the phenomenon of fast-falling birth rates in Europe. 
The population replacement level is 2.1 children per woman. The countries mentioned 
above have rates lower than that.  
9 See for instance Tomlinson & Maclennan (cited by Walkenhorst 2009:11), or Delanty 
(2002:348) 
10 I myself have not found one in recent (say XXI Century) peer-reviewed academic 
literature 
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fundamentally “one of us”’ (ibid). So becoming solidary to other European 
citizens and considering them as ‘one of us’, are verbs, actions, rather than 
nouns. Those actions are not exactly part of the concept of EI but they 
certainly derive from it as a consequence.  
 
EI may already be existing or not, but it can certainly be created by 
participation of the citizens in the public sphere. The ‘present moment’ (Iraq 
War) might be a great opportunity to generate EI, given ‘the difficulties of a 
situation into which we Europeans had been cast’ (ibid). Then he outlined 
what we could call the objective part of EI: the description of that ‘Europe’ 
which the citizens are invited to identify with. That Europe was ‘peaceful, 
cooperative…, open toward other cultures and capable of dialogue…’, and 
had come up with solutions to nationalism – by creating the EU, a form of 
‘governance beyond the nation-state’ – and to the injustices of capitalism – 
through the social welfare system. The challenge for Europe now was to 
‘defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law 
against competing visions’ (Habermas 2003:293-4).  
 
But what is distinctive about Europe? Some of its originally characteristic 
traits have been so successful that other regions have adopted them, 
basically all of the ‘West’: ‘Christianity and capitalism, natural science and 
technology, Roman law and the Code Napoleon, the bourge is-urban form 
of life, democracy and human rights, secularisation of the state and 
society…’ (ibid). He enunciates what he believes to be the uniqueness of 
Europe (its identity), its ‘face’: the overcoming of the destructive power of 
nationalism; an ‘incomparably’ rich cultural diversity; the acquired 
knowledge on how differences can be communicated, contradictions 
institutionalised, tensions stabilised, ‘otherness’ recognised; part of this EI is 
also the pacification of class conflict within the welfare state; the self-
limitation of state sovereignty within the framework of the EU; features of a 
‘common political mentality’ which include suspicion when the border 
between politics and religion is transgressed, a ‘relatively large amount of 
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trust’ in the organisational and steering capacities of the state, scepticism 
towards the achievements of the markets, moderated optimism regarding 
technical progress, keen sense of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’, a 
preference for the welfare state’s guarantees of social security and for 
regulations on the basis of solidarity; the desire fo  a multilateral and legally 
regulated international order and the hope for an effective global domestic 
policy within the framework of a reformed United Nations (Habermas 
2003:294-5).  
 
Habermas wonders whether this ‘mentality’ that forms part of EI is 
superficial or has deeper historical experiences and traditions. He sees EI 
not as natural, but rather as an artificial construction that must happen ‘in 
the daylight of the public sphere’. A European-wide public sphere needs to 
be embedded ‘in a political culture shared by all’ (Habermas 2001:19). This 
‘political culture’ seems to be part of EI for Habermas. The new awareness 
of what Europeans have in common is expressed ‘admir bly’ in the EU 
Charter of Basic Rights. The Charter articulates ‘a social vision of the 
European project’ and shows what links Europeans together from the 
normative point of view (Habermas 2001:21).  
 
For him, the emergence of national consciousness involved a ‘painful 
process of abstraction’ from local and dynastic identities to national and 
democratic ones (Habermas 2001:16). ‘Why’, he asks, ‘should the 
generation of a highly artificial kind’ of solidarity ‘among strangers’ – not 
go beyond the national level, to a European level? (ibid) But though 
arbitrarily invented, EI does not have to rely on an arbitrary political-ethical 
will for its formation or hermeneutics of processes of self-understanding 
(therefore EI is also a ‘self-understanding’). Since EI can be constructed, 
Europeans – through discussion in the public sphere – can decide which 
historical experiences they want to be included in their identity. Habermas 
proposes some ‘candidates’ for the historical grounding of EI.  
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The first possibility that he mentions – just to discard it as non-appropriate – 
is religion. Second, the European preference for politics over market and 
thence their trust in the civilising power of the state and its capacity to 
correct market failures. Third, the party system that ‘only in Europe’ serves 
an ideological competition that subjects ‘the socio-pathological results of 
capitalist modernisation to an ongoing political evaluation’. Fourth, an anti-
individualistic ethics of solidarity with the goal of equal provision for all. 
Fifth, a heightened sensitivity to personal and bodily integrity, after the 
experiences of totalitarianism. Sixth, the domestication of state power 
through mutual limitation of sovereignty – both at the national and 
international level. And seventh, the assumption by Europeans of a reflexive 
distance from themselves to account for their former violence in colonising 
and bringing about modernisation to other parts of the world (Habermas 
2003:295-7).  
 
Habermas’ notion of EI – from the subjective point of view – means ‘feeling 
of common political belonging’ and of the other citizens as being part of the 
same community (‘one of us’). Elsewhere he speaks of ‘an interest in and 
affective attachment to a particular ethos: in other words, the attraction of a 
specific way of life (Habermas 2001:8). EI engenders an abstract, civic 
solidarity among strangers, the citizens. From the objective point of view 
‘Europe’ asserts itself in the face of its ‘Other’ today, the USA. In 
contrast11, Europe is peace-seeking, power-moderated, colonially reflective, 
market-controlling, religion-suspecting, and so on. Since EI is an artefact, it 
must be built with the participation of all citizens in the public sphere, and it 
must contain those historical aspects that they want to choose as ‘common 
memory’ (history), which seems to be another important element of EI. 
Habermas notion of EI is difficult to encapsulate in only one of the sections 
in this review, it could go in the social welfare, the political legal or even the 
post-modern or the historical, depending on the accent. I name it 
                                               
11 Much easier to make during the Bush than during the Obama years 
What Soul for Europe?                     Unity, Identity & Diversity in the EU 
 16 
‘deliberative’ because the centre of EI is in Habermas’ view deliberation of 
civil society in the public sphere.  
 
 
 
 
‘Social’ EI 
 
For Anthony Giddens the core of EI is the ‘European Social Model’. EI 
must be a feeling of belonging to a community (Giddens 2007:277). On the 
objective side, he sees the EU as a community that is cosmopolitan, open. 
The members of this community share certain values and a purpose, a goal. 
Intra-European education and travel are important ways to promote this 
identity. The European community must have clear borders, ways to say 
which territories belong to Europe and which ones do not. There must be 
criteria to include some and exclude others from Europe, which does not 
mean that good relations should not be cultivated with all neighbours. He 
points out to the easiness with which nobody thinks of possible membership 
for countries in North-America with clear European links and background. 
In the same way, nobody doubts that Norway or Iceland could belong to the 
EU or question their being located in Europe. When it comes to defining 
those boundaries (in terms of possible members of the EU) Giddens recurs 
mainly to reasons of practicality and economic costs (2007:275-281).  
 
He sees the rejection of the European Constitution by Dutch and French in 
social and economical causes: the EU is not growing as fast as the USA 
(even less when compared to China or India) and there is need for a 
European debate in order to strive for the combinatio  of economic growth 
with high levels of social welfare after the example of the Nordic countries 
(Giddens 2007:294). Again, the face of Europe, the obj ct of identification, 
the source of legitimacy is an EU that achieves and offers the social model 
for its citizens (Giddens 2007:288).  
What Soul for Europe?                     Unity, Identity & Diversity in the EU 
 17 
 
Other aspects (but not as important as that one) are the fact that the EU is a 
new form of polity with trans-national governance (Giddens 2007:284); that 
the EU is not United States, Europeanness is not ‘Americanness’ (Giddens 
2007:276); the EU as an association or community of semi-sovereign 
nations but is not ‘post-national’ as Habermas argues (Giddens 2007:272); 
he coincides with Weiler in considering the EU a construction that promotes 
virtues like tolerance and humanity (Giddens 2007:269). He sees EI 
emerging as a product from the Cold War in the contrast with, on the one 
hand, American liberalism, and on the other, Soviet communism (Giddens 
2007:255). For him, the real problem with EI arose after 1989, with the 
expansion of the European Community eastward (ibid).  
 
In Gidden’s eyes the EU is a powerful source of democratising influence 
that promotes the rule of law and market economy; a protection for its 
citizens in the face of global threats; a way for cllective (European) 
defence and reaction for conflicts elsewhere in the word; a leader in climate 
change policy; a more egalitarian balance of power between the member 
states (Giddens 2007:258). Purposes for the existence of the EU are: the 
(European) social model; the conservation within and promotion without of 
a zone of peace and European values such as democracy, unity in diversity 
and solidarity (Giddens 2007:264). Again, it is difficult to reduce Giddens 
(or any other author) and his position to a defined label. Yet it is clear that 
for him subjective EI equates – as in the case of other authors – to a feeling 
of belonging. The object of EI, though, is strongly centred on what he 
understands as ‘the social model’.  
 
‘International’ EI 
 
It may be difficult to find what a Czech and a Spaniard have in common. 
But it might be easier to say why the polity of sort  which they both belong 
to is distinct from the Republic of Zambia, the Central American Integration 
What Soul for Europe?                     Unity, Identity & Diversity in the EU 
 18 
Region (SICA) or the Russian Federation. Ian Manners (2008) has coined a 
term to describe an (objective) identity for the European polity: the EU is ‘a 
normative power’ which promotes a series of substantive normative 
principles such as: ‘peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
equality, social solidarity, sustainable development a d good governance’. 
The way in which the EU promotes those principles is by being ‘a living 
example’ – in virtue-ethics terms), ‘reasonable’ – in deontological terms and 
by ‘doing less harm’ – in consequentialist terms (Manners 2008:66). Thus 
he depicts a polity which is arguably attractive as an object of identification. 
That is how Europeans (would like to) see themselve and to be seen by 
others in the world stage.  
 
The EU would be an example of ‘sustainable peace’ (Manners 2008:68-69) 
following the founders’ inspiration to make war not only unthinkable, but 
‘materially impossible’. The EU promotes this not only by encouraging 
dialog as a path for conflict resolution but also by devoting military 
capacities to strengthen peace in close accordance with the United Nations 
(UN) Charter.  
 
Its second principle is social freedom in a particular legal context, with the 
‘five freedoms’ (Manners 2008:69-70) being those of persons, goods, 
services, capital and establishment. Through the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its accession to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU promotes freedom of 
thought, expression, assembly and association.  
 
The EU is example and promoter of ‘consensual democracy’ (Manners 
2008:70) through proportional representation in the member states, and in 
the EU itself by power-sharing in the European Parliament. The EU has 
helped spread consensual democracy in Central and Estern Europe as part 
of the transition and accession processes. ‘The trinity of democracy, human 
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rights and the rule of law’ is to be consolidated an  supported in the EU’s 
external action (ibid).  
 
The fourth principle is associative (individual and collective) human rights 
(Manners 2008:71). They are associative ‘because they emphasize the 
interdependence between individual rights – for insta ce freedom of 
expression – and group rights – such as freedom of religion or belief’. These 
associative human rights are indivisible from consensual democracy, 
supranational rule of law and social solidarity.  
 
The ‘supranational rule of law’ principle (Manners 2008:71-72) is 
understood in three steps: intra-communitarian – through the acquis – 
international law – above and beyond the EU – and cosmopolitan – 
advancing the development and participation of the EU and its member 
states in humanitarian laws and rights applicable to individuals.  
 
The seventh principle of ‘inclusive equality’ (Manners 2008:72-73) forbids 
‘any discrimination based on any ground’. The principle of social solidarity 
seeks to foster a ‘balanced economic growth, social market economy, full 
employment, social inclusion, social justice and protection, 
intergenerational solidarity and social solidarity among and between 
member states and outside the Union contributing to solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade and the eradication of poverty’. 
 
The eight principle – ‘sustainable   development’ (Manners 2008:73-74) – 
seeks a balance between ‘uninhibited economic growth and biocentric 
ecological crisis’ in the environment, inside and outside the EU. Finally the 
last principle, ‘good governance’ (Manners 2008:74-75), emphasises 
‘quality, representation, participation, social partne ship, transparency and 
accountability in the democratic life of the Union’. The two distinctive 
features of the EU’s good governance are the participa on of civil society 
and multilateral cooperation.  
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The EU is a normative power. Unlike ‘the Axis of Ego’ – United States, 
Russia and China – (Manners 2008:80), it possesses the ability to establish 
normative principles and apply them to different realities. It represents in 
foreign policy a step beyond the sole play of national or regional interests 
and anchored instead in ethics and universally accepted values and 
principles (ibid).  
 
An identity based on the international image of the EU is certainly attractive 
as an impulse for unity. The principles Manners appeals to are ideals that 
few citizens and countries would oppose. It is in the details – cynics would 
point out – where the problems begin. The EU had a dubious role during the 
nineties in the Balkan wars. The 2003 Iraq war itself, taken sometimes as 
the icon distinguishing the US and the EU, is difficult to understand under a 
simplistic view. Not exactly all member states of the EU disagreed with 
United States. Several of them actually participated in the invasion (UK, 
Spain, Poland, Denmark…). The ‘soft power’ of Europe represented by 
French President Sarkozy, trying to set a fair agreement between Russia and 
Georgia in the aftermath of their war in 2008, achieved only modest results. 
Even after the creation of the position ‘High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ joint action remains difficult 
and slow.  
 
At any rate, this is another way to visualise EI. As in other cases, Manner’s 
vision does not necessarily exclude others.  
 
‘Post-modern’ EI  
 
Gerard Delanty has long been advocating for what he calls ‘cosmopolitan 
identity’ of Europe (see for example 1995). He defin s EI against either a 
‘national Europe’ or a ‘global (i.e. international) Europe’, as a 
‘cosmopolitan identity based on a cultural logic of self-transformation’ 
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rather than as a supranational identity (Delanty 2005:405). For him 
Europeanisation is not an exclusively institutional EU-led project, which 
produces a supranational identity in detriment of national identity. It is 
rather about bringing a transformation of statehood in Europe (2005:407). 
The EU is not a version of the nation-state writ large. Europeanisation is not 
a response to globalisation but its expression (2005:408). EI is a social 
reality, not an institutional construct or a legal-constitutional framework. 
Europe actually does have a ‘cultural existence’, though very weak in 
comparison to that of national identities. The nature of EI, argues Delanty, 
‘is one that in embracing diversity it cannot be a foundation for a cultural 
identity in the conventional sense of the term’ (2005:409). Culture is viewed 
by him as ‘a dynamic and creative process of imaginary signification’ (ibid). 
Against Habermas’ position (which in this paper I have called 
‘deliberative’), Delanty argues that there is little evidence that people 
identify strongly with constitutional principles’, that constitutional 
patriotism might be more German than European  and that Habermas’ vision 
of a post-national Europe  is limited: too European (2005:412). Finally, for 
Delanty Habermas sees values in too minimal a sense, and signals to 
Weiler’s claim for the recognition of the Judeo-Christian values as part of 
EI, as ‘paradoxically’ more tolerant than Habermas’ option for pure 
secularism (Delanty 2005:413). 
 
In his opinion modern cosmopolitanism (based on Kant), ‘generally lacked a 
political dimension and in fact is undistinguishable from internationalism’ 
(Delanty 2005:415). Instead he advocates for a cosmopolitanism beyond the 
nationalism v internationalism dichotomy, to a political project aimed at the 
transformation of loyalties and identities in a world of multiple modernities 
(2005:416). Cosmopolitanism is not a clearly defined but a contradictory, 
ambivalent and paradoxical project. For cosmopolitanism democracy loses 
priority to give way to a ‘new notion of integration’ within the European 
nations and also outside Europe. Cosmopolitanism is about ‘the 
transformation of cultural and political subjectivities in the context of the 
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encounter of the local or national with the global’. Europeanisation has more 
in common with cosmopolitanism than with ‘something specific as a 
European People, a European society, a European Superstate, or a European 
heritage (Delanty 2005:417)12.  
 
Finally, EI is ‘a form of post-national self-understanding that expresses 
itself within, as much as beyond, national identities…The local-global nexus 
is often the site of major social transformation’ (ibid). His cosmopolitan 
perspective ‘entails a recognition of the transformative dimension of societal 
encounters’. Europeanisation is producing greater convergence ‘but it is also 
consistent with plurality’, because ‘the integration of societies entails 
differentiation’. Yet greater convergence does not translate into more overall 
cohesion and for this reason ‘Europeanisation is difficult to democratize’ 
(Delanty 2005:418). In an apparent recognition of a post-modern 
atmosphere in Europe he explains that ‘the loss of markers of certainty’ has 
let to a ‘more communicative logic’ underpinned by ‘new discursive spaces’ 
(ibid). His idea of EI is that of a ‘self-understandi g’ not rooted ‘in a 
community of fate’ or in the state or territory, but ‘in a mode of recognition 
and discursive rationality that is decentred’ and ‘ot uniquely European’ 
(ibid). So an EI that is neither ‘identity’ nor ‘European’.  
 
In sum, the republican tradition based on the idea civil society and 
democratic governance is ‘limited when it comes to a movement such as 
Europeanization which is not based on a concrete people as such’ (Delanty 
2005:19). Because Europe lacks its ‘People’, democratisation is not the key 
to EI, which can be better described in terms of ‘self-transformation rather 
than self-governance’ (ibid). Cosmopolitanism would be more central to EI 
than republicanism, which as a political philosophy ‘assumes a certain unity 
to political community’, whereas cosmopolitanism operates under the 
assumption of ‘unity in terms of diversity’ (ibid).  
                                               
12 However he will speak elsewhere (Delanty 2010:15) about a ‘cosmopolitan cultural 
heritage’. 
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With these ideas Delanty tries to distance himself both from the cultural and 
deliberative perspectives. He also partially ignores the social and 
international ones.  
 
 
 
Official use of EI in politics 
 
It can be useful to consider at least one of the official positions that the EU 
(when it was still the ‘European Community’) 13 has taken in the past. 
Attending to the way in which EI is used by politicians can give light as to 
the implicit meaning they are assuming. The ‘Document on EI’ was 
published by the foreign ministers of the then nine m mber states in 
December 1973), with the goal is to better define th relations of the 
members (of the ‘European Communities’) with ‘other countries’ and on the 
world stage. Even though nearly forty years have passed since, the 
document shows traits that would continue to appear whenever the topic of 
identity was addressed in the acquis communautaire – the  ‘mobile 
constitution’ of the EU formed by its many treaties.  
 
The Nine14 had overcome ‘their past enmities’ and decided that unity was ‘a 
basic European necessity’, to ensure 'the survival of the civilization’ they 
had ‘in common’ (Document on EI 1973: 1). They wished to ensure respect 
for the ‘cherished values’ of their legal, political nd moral orders while 
preserving ‘the rich variety of their national cultures’ (ibid). Fundamental 
elements of EI (‘shared attitudes of life) were the principles of 
representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice (which was ‘the 
                                               
13 Or rather ‘communities’: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 
Euratom). 
14 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, UK 
What Soul for Europe?                     Unity, Identity & Diversity in the EU 
 24 
ultimate goal of economic progress’) and respect for human rights. Those 
principles corresponded to ‘the deepest aspirations’ f Europeans (from 
those nine nations at least) who should participate in their realisation 
especially ‘through their elected representatives’ (ibid).  
 
The Nine reaffirmed their ‘political will’ to succeed in the construction of a 
united Europe and to transform their communitites ‘into a European Union’ 
(Document on EI 1973: 2). EI’s originality and dynamism come from the 
diversity of cultures ‘within the framework of a common European 
civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing 
convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in 
common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United 
Europe’ (Document on EI 1973: 3).  
 
In the international scene ‘a very small number’ of increasing powerful 
countries motivated ‘Europe’ to unite and speak increasingly ‘with one 
voice’ if it wanted to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world’ 
(Document on EI 1973: 6). Likewise, Europe would never succeed in the 
essential aim to maintain peace if it neglected ‘its own security’. Therefore 
the Nine agreed on accepting the presence of USA’s nuclear weapons in the 
continent since ‘in the presence circumstances there is no alternative’ 
(Document on EI 1973: 8) – a  clear option for one f the two contending 
powers during the Cold War. The Document quickly clarifies that 
‘European unification is not directed against anyone, or inspired by a 
desire for power’, but rather to become ‘an element of equilibrium and a 
basis for cooperation with all countries ‘whatever their size, culture or social 
system’ (Document on EI 1973: 9)15, in accordance with ‘the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter’ (ibid). The Nine’s foreign policy 
would pursue that international relations have a more just basis, the 
                                               
15 This element presupposes a very interesting possibility: that of having an identity as a 
European polity, without by that implying exclusion in an absolute way with all countries 
and regions of the world, something that has become a reality as the EU has undertaken 
joint projects of cooperation in practically every continent. 
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independence and equality of States is better preserv d, prosperity is more 
equitably shared and security of each country is more effectively guaranteed 
(ibid).  
 
Interestingly, the Nine consider they share with USA ‘values and aspirations 
based on a common heritage’ and wish to maintain their constructive 
dialogue and continue their cooperation ‘in a spirit of friendship’ 
(Document on EI 1973: 14). In general all of the second part (‘European 
identity in relation to the world’) defines the future EU as a global actor and 
in its relations with USA, URSS, China, the Mediterranean, Latin America, 
Asia and the rest of Europe (Document on EI 1973: 9-21). There is therefore 
a strong charge of the international meaning of EI.  
 
Finally, the Nine foresee that EI ‘will evolve in function of the dynamic 
construction of a United Europe’. By undertaking the definition of their own 
identity in contrast to other countries or groups of c untries, ‘they will 
strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely 
European foreign policy’ (Document on EI 1973: 22).  
 
Toward a concept of EI  
 
From the preceding analysis a few elements emerge which could get us 
closer to a synthetic notion of EI. It is clear, first of all, that EI can be 
approached from the perspective of the subject who experiences or 
possesses it, or from that of the object of that experience. Subjective EI is 
usually called ‘identification’, ‘commonality’, ‘Europeanness’, ‘feeling of 
belonging’. The ‘subject’ is the collectivity of European citizens (or 
sometimes of member states). The subjective side of EI is therefore 
identification of the Europeans with Europe, but noat the individual level, 
rather at the collective level. Therefore subjective identity refers to a 
common denominator arguably present in all members of the collectivity, 
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not the identity (or identities) of individuals. This is the subjective aspect of 
EI.  
 
The objective aspect, the centre of identification, is the European polity. It 
has to do with what the EU is, or what image it projects, or what it is not. 
This aspect of EI will often translate into discussion  about the future of 
European project, or its past, or its achievements, or the kind of polity the 
EU is, or its place in the world stage.  
 
EI speaks of identification of subjects (‘Europeans’) with an object 
(‘Europe’): but what kind of ‘object’? Is it ‘Europe’ considered as society, 
culture, economy, art, landscape or polity? The list can be longer. The 
concept of EI does not necessarily have to be political. My research is about 
EI considered only from the political point of view: that is, Europe the polity 
as the object of identification. Even when I study culture, history, religion, 
international affairs, social way of life or any other aspect to explain EI, I 
take them exclusively inasmuch as they seem to matter so that Europeans 
will identify with Europe as a polity.  
 
Another element that comes up from the analysis is that, however light, 
inclusive and ‘politically correct’ the definition, as long as we speak of 
‘European’ identity something and someone will be in, something and 
someone will stay out, of the concept. EI implies dlimitation, definition. It 
does not imply extermination, discrimination or oppression of anyone not 
included in the concept of ‘Europe’ or ‘European’. It is perfectly possible to 
establish a very close, inclusive and cordial relation with non-Europeans16. 
Otherwise everyone and anyone could be a ‘European’ – a sure way to 
rending the term altogether meaningless. There is a definitory and intrinsic 
characteristic in EI, a limit that any identity implies. Only taking this into 
                                               
16 Could there be a better relation than the one Europeans have with (just to give a few 
examples) Canadians, Americans, Australians or Argentinians? None of them expects to be 
called ‘European’ or feels discriminated against if /he is not.  
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account Europeans can say what they are as a community, a d therefore 
who is in or out. Definition does not have to mean ssentialism either. This 
takes me to the next distinction. 
 
EI has two chronological aspects: what has already p st, and the future, still 
to happen. The part of EI that looks back is Europe’s collective memory, its 
history. The part that looks forward is the project, its future. Some argue for 
one view in detriment of the other. But that does not have to be that way. 
Past and future can well be part of EI. And so it could be with elements of 
other definitions. 
 
It seems to me that the discussion about EI could be caricatured as a polemic 
about what makes a good dinner. One party might argue that what sets the 
tone to it are the appetizers: they define your whole attitude and experience 
from the start. A second party might say that the key is a savoury salad, 
because of its content and colours. A third, party might passionately defend 
the place of the main course, which justly is called ‘main’ and at the end 
stands for what you really had for dinner – inside this position you might 
have a bitter dispute between sea-food, meat and poultry advocates. A 
fourth school might revive the element that has been omitted in every other 
study: the importance of desert. Still a fifth one might discard the first four 
as irrelevant and bring to attention the incomparable role of drinks in their 
different kinds either at the beginning, during or at the end of the meal… A 
final group might argue for a less restrictive, non-judgemental (why speak 
about ‘good’ dinner?), non-exclusivist, less table-centred, post-culinary 
concept of dinner as a space of encounter of different opinions, attitudes and 
experiences regarding food, drinks and tastes… But, could not it be that a 
good dinner depended on the combination of several of those elements, 
keeping a certain balance that has into account the importance and place of 
each and every (or nearly every) one of them? 
 
What Soul for Europe?                     Unity, Identity & Diversity in the EU 
 28 
From the positions analysed in the paper, I do not see why culture and 
democratic deliberation – Christianity and Enlightenment – could not both 
be part of EI. In the same way a ‘welfare polity’ can without conflict be also 
at a ‘soft (or normative) power’ in the world scene. Could not the 
uniqueness of Europe, its distinctive identity, resid  on being a polity 
grounded on the inspiration of the rich (spiritual and ethical) values of the 
Biblical tradition, built with the participation of civil society (deliberation 
and democracy), maintaining a mixture and justice or ‘social-market 
economy’ for its society, playing a pacifying and civilising role in the 
international stage, and open up to a certain extent to multiplicity and 
difference? 
 
What soul for Europe? 
 
In this last part I would like to submit the idea tha  EI has several elements 
if analysed from the perspectives suggested in the precedent section. 
Attending to its history, there is no doubt that boh the Biblical tradition and 
the Enlightenment have place in it and form part of i s culture. 
 
As a political project EI has a strong republican orientation which co-exists 
with the ‘market-only’ – ‘no-polity’ – position and still today continues to 
push in the direction of making of the EU a democrati , representative, 
legitimate and participative polity.  
  
Looking inwards, the polity EU may show that EI is strongly related today 
with the social aspect: prosperity and justice walking along together. 
Widespread economic improvement has always been a hallmark of the EU. 
 
Looking outwards, EI has to do with how others perceive the EU or at least 
– and more important for our study – how Europeans would like to be 
perceived abroad. The ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power comes into place here, a 
force for peace and prosperity in the world, a bulwark of international law 
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and civilised coexistence; often loudly ‘a non-USA’, almost imperceptibly 
as well a ‘non-Russia’ and ‘non-China’. No matter how it is defined, 
Europeans know they are (or would like to see themselve  as being) 
different in comparison with other countries and regions of the world.  
 
The final element, that of openness to multiplicity, s also part of EI, but in 
my opinion it has limits. Its cosmopolitanism goes well with the times of 
globalisation, yet its consideration of democracy as secondary deserves at 
least careful examination – the alternative to democracy is elitism. What is 
more important, neither of the thinkers here analysed is suggesting, when 
advancing their proposals for EI, that the EU should not be open and 
diverse. Setting contours of a polity in order to define it is actually not a 
hindrance for constructive, friendly and peaceful engagement with non-
European citizens or non-EU countries and regions: rather, it is a pre-
requisite. Openness to multiplicity has to be nuanced. ‘Europe’ is not an 
equivalent of Planet Earth. Accordingly, its identity has to be much more 
modest and contain a degree of particularity (which, as we have seen above, 
has nothing to do with contempt for non-Europeans). An exercise of 
definition that blasts all the boundaries cannot be a ‘de-finition’ – 
etymologically ‘a setting of limits’).  
 
Jewish Professor JHH Weiler makes a point to this respect regarding one of 
the elements of EI analysed here which could be deemed more polemic and 
exclusivist – that of the Christian past. His argument applies all the more to 
the rest of the elements. During the debate about the mention of God and or 
Christianity in the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, Weiler wonders if 
that could not compromise Europe’s self-understanding as a society and 
polity built on tolerance and multiculturalism. Then he advances a concept 
of tolerance that could go well with our notion of EI:
 
What of our Muslim citizens? What of our Jewish citizens? Would 
they not feel excluded? (...) True tolerance – as th t discipline of the 
soul which resists the tendency to coerce the other – can only exist 
against a basic affirmation or certain truths. And there is a contempt 
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for the other, not respect, in an ‘everything goes attitude’. How can I 
respect the identity of the other if I do not respect my own identity? 
And why would a Mulsim or a Jew, as religious minorties, feel safe 
in a society which excludes from its identitarian icons recognition of 
its very religious identity? (…) People come to these countries partly 
because of their tradition of tolerance; because in spite of their own 
traditions they can warmly welcome somebody who does not share in 
them. (Weiler 2006:8). 
 
EI has given elements that should not be ignored. They allow the EU to set 
terms of the encounter and integration of its new imm grants and the states 
applying for membership. At the same time, EI will be as dynamic and 
changing as the citizens of Europe17. Stating clearly what defines Europeans 
today does not mean that such should be their configuration as a political 
community in the future. But ignoring fundamental traits of their identity 
will be of no help to Europeans themselves, immigrants or non-Europeans, 
as Weiler points out.  
 
Before concluding I would like to bring to attention three ideas that need 
further research. First, in the discussion about EI I have assumed – not 
demonstrated – that a certain kind of cohesion18 is required among the 
members of a polity in order to keep it together. There is debate as to what 
the source of cohesion can or should be, but not regarding the need for 
cohesion – something that appears for many as self-evident.  
 
 Second, the concept of EI seems to have place for several of the positions 
analysed. I have introduced those positions and hinted to the idea that they 
might be stressing different aspects of a wider comm n notion. I do not 
think it is difficult to show this but I have not done it here due to constraints 
of space. The ‘models’ or ‘positions’ on EI might be rather ‘aspects’ of it – 
                                               
17 An EI that will keep the European polity together today is different to the one in 2100, 
for example, when according to Professor Philip Jenkins (2006:533) Europe could have ‘a 
Muslim population of around 25 percent’.  
 
18 Which I have equated with ‘identity’.  
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at least up to a certain extent. The cultural aspect leaves the question of how 
to organise the polity open, and therefore does not clash with the 
deliberative aspect, as long as the cultural aspect is not completely ignored 
or denied. What the international aspect sells to the world is its culture, its 
deliberative organisation and its successful combinatio  of ‘progress & 
justice’. The deliberative aspect cannot help relying on common memories, 
a shared ‘political culture’ and mention of ‘the Axis of Ego’ or alternative 
‘Others’ in order to define EI. The ‘post-modern’ aspect, while privileging 
multiplicity, still advances the idea of a ‘cultural heritage’ for Europe.  
 
Third and last, the concept of EI is definable and lso evolving, given and 
dynamic. After all the collective EU – the polis – is composed of its citizens 
– the politai – who themselves have a given past, preferences and 
allegiances, but also an open future towards which they evolve in varied 
ways. This dynamism is stressed in the ‘post-modern’ aspect of EI, and 
rightly so, as long as it does not override completely the given aspect. In this 
paper I have not expound on ‘the right balance’, which I think could be 
developed departing from Beuchot’s concept of ‘analogical hermeneutics’ 
(2004:33-44)19. A purely essentialist account of EI will be similar to an inert 
statue. But so will be an exaggerated emphasis on multiplicity: a post-
identity, post-European conception of ‘European identity’ will advance little 
as a contribution our quest. 
 
In this paper I have tried to inquire the factors that keep a polity together 
despite the diversity of its members. With that purpose I have explained five 
positions on EI. Then I have proposed a synthesis and suggested that the 
five positions to a certain extent present aspects – not necessarily in 
contradiction with the rest – of the same concept. Finally I have outlined 
                                               
19 Which could also bring light on how to achieve social integration of culturally-different 
immigrants in Europe through his idea of ‘interculturality’, which is an application of the 
same notion – analogical hermeneutics – to the problem of cultural diversity in a polity 
(Beuchot 2005:33-44).  
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three issues about EI that due to constraints of space have been only 
indicated but require further research. 
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